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Introduction
I shall begin by clarifying the concept of 
post-nomadism, used here with reference to 
the subject and to architecture. Rather than 
supposing a transition between forms of life 
conceived as distinct and whole, one nomadic 
and the other sedentary, post-nomadism sug-
gests transformations of a nomadic way of 
life without assuming that they constitute a 
trajectory toward a sedentist notion of becom-
ing settled. These transformations, which are 
variously legal, material, political and social, 
cannot in practice be disentangled. Familism, 
architecture and settlement form, and the 
status and claims of legal/extra-legal subjects 
are interdependently involved. 
We may not assume such changes will 
result in either greater incorporation or 
increased alienation vis à vis the state. As 
described in the European Court’s press 
release following Connors v The United 
Kingdom in 2004 (ECtHR Application no. 
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OPTICON
The Caravan Sites Act 1968 imposed a duty on local authorities in the United 
Kingdom to provide sites for ‘gipsies’ (sic). Contradictory aims of active repression, 
enforced dependency and notional integration combined in a mode of dwelling 
invented and controlled by the state, but increasingly promoted, transformed 
and privatised by Travellers themselves. In a ruling in 2004 against the United 
Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights found that local authority sites 
were ‘homes’ under Article Eight of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
and tantalisingly described the UK’s Traveller population as ‘nomadic in spirit if not 
in actual or constant practice’ (Connors v. the United Kingdom, ECtHR 267, 2004, 
Press Release of the Registrar: 4). This paper explores the paradox of permanent 
temporariness imbedded in the relation between the UK Traveller site, the legal 
category of the gypsy, and the house of the post-war planning system. It argues 
that post-nomadic architectures and subjectivities radically challenge the public-
private nexus of citizenship, property, and family objectified in the post-war ideal 
of the permanent house. In the house, as Engels (1948 [1891]) describes, political 
economy and the materiality of dwelling and family life collide, and the tension 
of contradictions eventually gives rise to new house forms and concomitant social 
relations. The paper draws on anthropological fieldwork in the UK and Ireland to 
revisit the house as a field of productive instability.
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66746/01), contradictory processes occur 
in tandem, irresolution and legal insecurity 
persist, and state policies turn out to have 
unexpected consequences. In the UK as else-
where, the homogenising tendency of the 
state is belied by forms of governance that 
depend upon ‘culturalist rhetorics’ of incom-
mensurability (Stolcke 1995: 4), reproducing 
hierarchies of citizenship as irreducible facts. 
Ambiguous citizenship, such as the category 
of the gypsy in UK planning law, constitutes 
an enduring element of the Foucaultian 
play of forces that constitute modern states 
(Agamben 2005; Feldman 2001; Neumann 
1996; Yiftachel 2009).
Post-nomadic architecture and, in particu-
lar, the Traveller site (Figure 1), the focus 
of this paper, is thus the material centre 
of unresolved questions about the role of 
law and the state in dwelling, property and 
familism. Drawing on Judith Butler’s rejec-
tion, in Antigone’s Claim (2000), of the 
notion that kinship constitutes a pre-polit-
ical sphere, we might frame the question: 
When the state confronts intimate sites of 
human embodiment and reproduction, turn-
ing them into representations and instru-
ments of power, what kind of deformation 
of sovereignty occurs? This paper explores 
the relation between the officialised mate-
rial world of the Traveller site, the symbolic 
deformation of the post-war house, and the 
configuration of post-nomadic subjectivities. 
Among post-nomadic subjects, family for-
mation, livelihoods, architectures, and modes 
of dwelling are shaped and reworked at inter-
sections (points of conflict or accommoda-
tion) between notions of authority, concepts 
of personhood, parallel as well as integrated 
economies, and, increasingly, both national 
and transnational systems of law. Butler 
states that Antigone’s ‘autonomy is gained 
through the appropriation of the authorita-
tive voice of the one she resists’ (Butler 2000: 
11). Such a conflict between ‘simultaneous 
refusal and assimilation of [resisted] author-
ity’ (Butler 2000: 11) determines the predica-
ment of post-nomadic subjects, who seek, by 
turns, to circumvent, deploy, and challenge 
national laws which were designed to relieve 
Fig 1: View from the Traveller site. Site reconstruction. Ireland 2007. 
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the state of the burden of ‘requisite proce-
dural safeguards’ (ECtHR Registrar 2004: 4) 
in its dealings with Travellers. Post-nomadic 
subjectivities thus pose what Balibar calls 
the onto-political problem of the subject. 
He observes: ‘[T]he modern identity of man 
and citizen did not lead to the pure and 
simple negation or Aufhebung1 of the sub-
jection to the Law, as an “inner” voice. It has 
led, rather, to a new twist, a new degree of 
interiorisation … along with a new “privacy” 
of the moral sentiments’ (Balibar 1994: 13). 
This new interiority is made visible as the 
‘collective or transindividual construction of 
… individual autonomy’ (Balibar 1994: 12). 
Following Balibar, subjectivity, as the term 
is used here, thus speaks of a public (or col-
lective) self-relation that claims for ‘private 
life’2 the right to self-determination (Warner 
2002). For contemporary Travellers in the UK 
and Ireland, self-determination is expressed 
as a cultural claim to the ‘private life’ of the 
Traveller site, and this claim, including the 
limitations on state interference to which 
it gives rise to under Article Eight of the 
European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), was upheld by the European Court’s 
2004 judgment in the case of Connors.
In this context, the paper explores the 
status and materiality of the UK Traveller 
site as part of a field of dwelling and private 
life normatively constituted by the house of 
the post-war planning system, and considers 
the transformations, challenges, and subjec-
tivities that animate this field. The planning 
system, understood less, in its own benign 
terms, as a rational system for organizing the 
built and natural environment, is perceived 
as a form of government in which interde-
pendent oppositions between notions of 
public and private are extensively redefined 
in and through property. In other words, 
the house of post-war planning, frequently 
referred to here as a field, is the institutional 
and material form of unresolved social rela-
tions between subjects and the state. 
This paper is divided into two main parts, 
followed by a concluding discussion that 
questions the concept of the field as con-
ceived by Bourdieu (1985, 1989), and its 
dialectical configuration with the habitus 
of subjectivity. The first section traces the 
ideological origins of the Traveller site in 
government’s attempt to rationalise an 
unkempt edge of dwelling without property 
that eluded the post-war system of plan-
ning. This examines the history of a key 
opposition between values of permanence 
and temporariness that continues to con-
tour mutual resistance between the site and 
the house. 
The second part, drawn from fieldwork car-
ried out in the UK between 2005 and 2007, 
describes a raid on a site by police and plan-
ning officers, and looks at how contemporary 
relations between the site, the house, and 
the legal category of the gypsy are played out 
in practice. 
The final discussion considers Bourdieu’s 
endeavour to reconfigure the problem of 
the subject (1977, 1985) in the idealised dia-
lectic between habitus and field. The paper 
concludes that ethical relations between 
architecture, dwelling and politics, where the 
field of the house is neither autonomous nor 
bounded, demand a more nuanced account 
of the politics of gesture in post-nomadic 
subjectivities. 
A note on orthography and 
terminology
The terms ‘gypsy’ and ‘Gypsy’ are used 
throughout this paper in their legal and tech-
nical meanings. In planning law, the uncapi-
talised ‘gypsy’ refers to ‘persons of nomadic 
habit of life, whatever their race or origin’ 
(Caravan Sites and Control of Development 
Act (CSCDA) 1960 s24 (8)). Travellers who 
have lived in houses are sometimes claimed 
to have lost their ‘gypsy status’ (Johnson and 
Willers 2007: 109–115), a charge which prej-
udices a planning application for a private 
site; gypsy status, a legal concept that plays 
an important role in the self-determination 
of Travellers’ modes of dwelling, is thus a 
principal area of legal contention. The upper 
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case form, ‘Gypsy,’ as used in race relations, 
conveys the law’s concept of membership 
of an ethnic group, and makes anti-Gypsy 
discrimination illegal.3 Government publi-
cations characteristically observe the legal 
implications of these different spellings, 
often using both forms in the same docu-
ment,4 since, in law, someone can be a gypsy 
without being a Gypsy, and vice versa. 
However, the upper case form is often 
used exclusively by contemporary advocates 
of Gypsy rights, including lawyers, activists 
and many scholars, irrespective of context. 
Although scholars and activists seldom 
explain such orthographic decisions, it could 
be inferred that this normative delineation of 
(legal) ethnicity is held to reflect a more com-
plete idea of the natural or social person. In 
the case of Johnson and Willers’ legal hand-
book (2007) the use throughout of ‘Gypsy’ 
for planning law’s ‘gypsy,’ on the basis that 
only the former spelling is correct (personal 
communication with Chris Johnson), implies 
that legal and natural persons are one and 
the same, and leads to confusing results in 
discussions of national law. To add to this 
complexity, in contrast to both the UK gov-
ernment and Gypsy advocates, the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) uses only 
the lower case form, ‘gypsy’, to refer to natu-
ral persons. In other words, ECtHR does not 
distinguish legal from natural (human) per-
sons, with the exception of the state (a legal 
person only), and human rights are held to 
be natural rights. 
It should be acknowledged that ortho-
graphic practice is not fixed, and continues 
to change in relation to Travellers’ legal and 
political status. Notably, a Communities 
and Local Government publication in 2008, 
‘Implementing the Mobile Homes Act 1983 
on local authority Gypsy and Traveller sites,’ 
uses the upper case spellings of Gypsy and 
Traveller throughout, although the subject 
is planning law. (This example, to my knowl-
edge, is exceptional.)
This paper reflects a critique of essentialist 
or official notions of natural persons, based 
on the understanding that both technical 
‘gypsies’ and ‘Gypsies’ qua natural or ‘eth-
nic’ persons denote politico-legal catego-
ries. I aim to show how such categories are 
performatively realised in the discursive and 
material architectures of the Traveller site 
and the courtroom. I use the legally unde-
fined term ‘Traveller’, long used by English 
Romany, Scottish, and Irish Travellers, except 
where a specific politico-legal meaning of 
‘Gypsy’ or ‘gypsy’ is intended. The upper case 
reflects widespread current usage: it distin-
guishes Travellers from the general term, 
travellers, and reflects Travellers’ recognition 
of shared, nomadic histories and ethnic rela-
tions with sedentary society.
1. The invention of the Traveller site
The aim of the Caravan Sites Act 1968 Part 
II (CSA) was to license and control a mode 
of dwelling that would mediate a transition 
in which nomadic subjects could be encour-
aged to adopt ‘a settled way of life’ without 
actively ‘assimilationist’ policies (cf Adams 
et al 1975: 11–12, 20–21). Local authori-
ties, having failed to respond to the earlier 
Caravan Sites and Control of Development 
Act 1960 (CSCDA), which empowered them 
to provide sites, would now be compelled to 
do so. 
Importantly, it was not only the way of life 
of those termed gypsies which the 1960 Act 
had targeted, but a diverse, growing popula-
tion. A government-commissioned report in 
1959 entitled Caravans as Homes (Wilson 
1959), estimated that, ‘vagrants apart,’ one in 
three hundred of the population was living 
permanently in a caravan (Mann 1961: 151). 
This amounted to around 60,000 households 
or 150,000 people, excluding those Wilson 
identified as ‘gypsies and vagrants’ (HL Deb 
(1960), 244: Col. 581). An industry that 
produced 1,000 caravans per year in 1938 
was turning out 86,500 twenty years later 
(Jackson 1965: 216–7). However, in the years 
leading up to the two Caravan Sites Acts, 
which in the first instance sought to control 
caravan-dwelling tout court, perceptions of a 
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‘gypsy problem’ (Dodds 1966: 26, 160) dis-
tinguished between different types of ‘cara-
vanners,’ and this distinction soon held legal 
consequences. 
First, the 1960 Act imposed a licensing 
requirement on all land occupied by cara-
vans. This led to widespread evictions of 
encampments of perceived gypsies (Adams 
et al 1975: 11–13). Farmers and landown-
ers who had allowed seasonal workers to 
overwinter caravans on their land opted to 
turn them off rather than establish formal, 
licensed sites (Dodds 1966: 151; Kenrick and 
Clark 1999: 88). Since local councils now 
managed the commons as public space, the 
CSCDA1960 granted them the power to evict 
caravans from commons and woodlands 
which had long supported nomadic popula-
tions. The combined impact of these provi-
sions was dramatic. Long lines of caravans 
began to appear alongside the A2 and other 
major roads (Evans 2004: 98–99). While 
councils embraced the new sanctions against 
Travellers, the power to provide legal sites 
was ignored. 
In the face of growing pressure, the 
Caravan Sites Act 1968 imposed a duty on 
local authorities to provide sites ‘for the use 
of gipsies [sic] and other persons of nomadic 
habit’ (CSA 1968: 1), which from the first 
were thus known as gypsy or Traveller sites. 
The status and tenure of local authority site 
residents marked them out from occupants 
of licensed, private caravan sites. Protection 
from arbitrary eviction, introduced in 1968 
for ‘residential occupiers’ of private sites, did 
not apply to local authority gypsy sites (CSA 
1968: 1–2). Licensed residential sites were 
called ‘protected sites’ and their different legal 
status was further enhanced by the Mobile 
Homes Act (MHA) 1983, which increased 
residents’ security of tenure (Johnson and 
Willers 2007: 65–66). To sum up, from the 
outset a tension existed in caravan site pol-
icy and legislation between improving liv-
ing conditions and security for those who 
were not defined as nomadic by controlling 
the abuses of hitherto unlicensed landlords, 
and, depending on one’s point of view, either 
controlling, attempting to eliminate, or facili-
tating the way of life of habitual nomads or 
gypsies, perceived (as official orthography 
would later reflect,) although not acknowl-
edged, as a kind of people, ‘Gypsies’ (cf Dodds 
1966: 17–19; Veysey-Fitzgerald 1944). 
In the view of some advocates, local 
authority sites were a way of encouraging 
settled or ‘integrated’ life (Dodds 1966: 25), 
which meant fixed employment and school 
education for children. Some, including MP 
Norman Dodds, sought to end the crimi-
nalisation of Travellers that resulted from 
the CSCDA 1960, while broadly supporting 
policies that would eventually ‘eliminate the 
gypsy problem’ (Dodds 1966: 25), understood 
fundamentally as a humanitarian issue. For 
an alliance that included the Gypsy Council 
and the National Council for Civil Liberties 
(NCCL), sites meant recognition of Travellers’ 
right ‘to participate in our multi-racial soci-
ety as a minority group with a distinctive 
culture and style of living’ (cited in Adams 
et al 1975: 14). The enormous variation or 
incompatibility between the viewpoints of 
different advocates of statutory local author-
ity Traveller sites meant that the 1968 Act 
was widely welcomed and encountered little 
opposition, although what sites really were 
and what they would do was far less clear.
Formalising the temporary
The salient notion of gypsy dwelling as tem-
porary underwrote local authority site policy. 
In the first instance, it suggested an external 
perspective of nomadic dwelling as ‘here 
today and gone tomorrow,’ or temporary-in-
itself. Second, the caravan, defined by size, 
mobility, and construction (CSA 1968: 6–7), 
signalled material grounds of difference from 
the supposedly permanent house. And third, 
as explored below, it harboured an expecta-
tion of policy-makers that legislative pressure 
would curb, if not rapidly eliminate, mobile 
or temporary dwelling. Between these tem-
poral, material, and politico-historical impli-
cations of the temporary, the gypsy caravan 
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might be perceived as something which 
has no automatic right to remain, which is 
which is tolerated for the time being, and, 
unlike a house, can legitimately be got rid of. 
The denial to local authority site gypsies (as 
defined by CSA 1968) of rights and security 
comparable to those of the residents of park 
homes, as they came to be known, reinforces 
this interpretation.
Precedents for dealing with the tempo-
rary could be found in Abercrombie’s 1944 
Greater London Plan, the blueprint of the 
post-war planning system. A key proposal 
here was to empower local authorities to 
license existing private dwellings on owner-
occupied land that were nevertheless per-
ceived as unacceptably ‘temporary’ on an 
annual basis, under a system of ‘proper 
surveillance’ (Abercrombie 1945: 131–132), 
and with a background threat of compulsory 
purchase. Having effectively curtailed the 
interwar growth of plotland settlements on 
low-value agricultural land through the new 
mechanisms of land zoning and the green-
belt, the aim of licensing private property 
was to ensure that the ‘jumble of shacks 
and bungalows on the Laindon Hills and at 
Pitsea’ and elsewhere would transform into 
‘permanent’ houses under the watchful eye 
of the state (Abercrombie 1945: 98). 
In short, property was incompatible with 
temporariness. The enormous expansion of 
land ownership that, for the small price of a 
rural plot and a caravan or self-built ‘shack’ 
bought freedom from urban landlords and 
the ruin of war, was to be halted by the 
state’s new tenure of the real house, defined 
as ‘permanent’ and controlled by planning. 
If, as seems inevitable, the Caravan Sites Acts 
of 1960 and 1968 were influenced by the 
Greater London Plan’s values and assump-
tions, a crucial distinction—that the Traveller 
site would officialise intentional temporari-
ness—was overlooked. 
The contradictions between enforced 
dependency, active repression, and notional 
integration that the 1968 Caravan Sites Act 
embodied marked the paradox of the official 
Traveller site’s formal delineation of an infor-
mal status, that of the nomadic ‘gypsy’ indi-
cated by the Act (discussed below). Traveller 
dwelling in this guise would neither be incor-
porated on an equal footing by the planning 
system nor utterly excluded. The site was 
neither a camp nor a house, and lacked the 
principal features of either. We might briefly 
characterise these here.
Irish Travellers concisely describe the 
camp’s recursive settlement form, based 
on variation and repetition, as ‘coming and 
going.’ This phrase distinguishes the social-
ity of dwelling in camps from the contingent 
mobility of nomadic subsistence, referred 
to simply as being ‘on’ or ‘beside the road.’ 
Camps foreground enduring interdependen-
cies between ever-extending transformations 
of adjacent generations of one’s ‘own peo-
ple.’ These interests and commitments are 
made visible by ‘coming and going’ between 
multiple camps of the ‘own people’ of both 
husband and wife, to whom unmarried off-
spring belong equally. The site’s physical 
boundaries, designed to contain a fixed coa-
lition of rent-paying gypsies and to prevent 
the flexibility of the camp, definitively pre-
clude the intentional architectures of ‘com-
ing and going’ (see also Kenrick and Clark 
1999: 95–100). 
The distance between the site and the 
house was similarly unbridgeable. In 1944, 
the house had been newly re-imagined at the 
centre of planning’s system of government. 
The state authorised private property (land 
and buildings) subject to the claim of state 
ownership over the use of property. From 
1965, statutory building standards consti-
tuted a built-in modality of government.5 
The dimensions of windows, footings, joists 
and plumbing pipes, the angle of stairs, and 
construction of roofs all stamped the house 
as a fully legal commodity—a real, that is to 
say, permanent house. The dependent status 
of the site in local authority ownership and 
the statutory materiality of temporary dwell-
ing strategically prevented the Traveller site 
from becoming property, while Travellers 
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themselves shared neither the legal protec-
tions of householders nor those of the resi-
dents of protected sites. 
House/ home/ property
The bricks and mortar house thus mate-
rialised interdependency and opposition 
between notions of public and private in a 
configuration that has come to dominate 
the interproduction of familism, property, 
and citizenship. A semi-autonomous agent 
of Abercrombie’s vision of the ‘balanced 
arrangement’ of ideal community, in which 
neighbourhoods and towns enjoy ‘physical 
definition and unmistakeable separateness’ 
(Abercrombie 1944: 112), the house, its value 
under-written by the state, was the official-
ising structure (Bourdieu 1990: 108) of the 
field of dwelling6 tout court, the authorised 
manifestation of stable, social relations and 
imaginary scene of personal autonomy. Three 
overlapping terms, which can never be utterly 
disentangled—house, home, and property—
delineate commodified and decommodified 
value in the same object, marking insecure 
separations between autonomy, dependency 
and resistance in the public-private relations 
of the house. 
The state’s new tenure of the house had 
distinct advantages for those who owned 
land and buildings in 1945. By limiting the 
supply of building land, land zoning instantly 
increased the commodity value of houses, 
while, from 1965, statutory building stand-
ards fetishised a technical system of autono-
mous value in the house. Real, permanent 
houses could be imagined as almost limit-
less instruments of production, constantly 
producing value, provided that the state, as 
the surrogate of Abercrombie’s ‘community’ 
(Abercrombie 1945: 112–116), maintained 
its ‘proper surveillance’ (Abercrombie 1945: 
132) over what went on beyond the fence. 
This new configuration of value and interest 
was now intensely predicated on the outside 
of the house in ways that made it vulnerable.
From the late twentieth century, as 
Travellers have begun to seek planning 
permission for privately-owned sites, the 
mythic crime of the gypsy has become the 
theft of value from the house.7
The gypsy as legal person
The first definition of the gypsy in law, that 
of Mills v Cooper 1967 (All E.R. 100, 1967), 
arose in response to a challenge to prosecu-
tion. The 1959 Highways Act (S. 127) made it 
illegal for a ‘gypsy’ to park overnight beside 
the road, an act that was lawful for persons 
of any other status.8 Mr Cooper’s defence was 
that he was not a gypsy, an argument that 
had proved successful for him once before. 
For centuries until Mills v Cooper penal law 
had found it unnecessary, and certainly not 
useful, to engage in the matter of defini-
tions, preferring to use a scattergun of vague 
terms - ‘gypsies,’ ‘vagrants,’ ‘vagabonds,’ and 
‘masterless men’ (cf. Fraser 1993, Mayall 
1988, Willems 1998) - to round up those 
the state sought to condemn. ‘Gypsies’ were 
thus ‘our Middle Ages preserved; dangerous 
classes of an earlier epoch’ (Becker-Ho cited 
in Agamben 2000: 64). 
What gave rise to the judges’ definition 
of the ‘gypsy’ as a ‘nomad’ in Mills v Cooper 
was the move from a property regime that 
included commons to one of interdepend-
ence between material notions of public 
and private. As well as highways, public 
space included woods and commons that 
fringed the metropolis, the green lungs of 
Abercrombie’s urban body, and suddenly, 
there was an urgent relation between the 
two. Those evicted from the commons 
who were now forced to camp beside the 
road were the specific targets of the 1959 
Highways Act: gypsies, albeit still undefined 
in law. The category of the gypsy thus objec-
tifies a particular relation, one of intrinsic 
illegality, to this spatialised public realm 
where the state’s intention is made visible, 
that of the former commons. In spite of 
Lord Parker’s caution that his definition of 
‘“gypsy” [meaning] no more than a person 
leading a nomadic life with no, or no fixed, 
employment and with no fixed abode … will 
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not be considered as the words of a statute’ 
(All E.R.100 at 103H, cited in Sandland 1996: 
388), this new legal person, whom Lord 
Parker CJ confirmed ‘merely as conveying 
the general idea of a gypsy’ was about to be 
made visible in the 1968 Caravan Sites Act 
by means of a register of effects negatively 
determined by property and the real, perma-
nent house. 
Mr Cooper, being a gypsy according to 
‘the general idea of a gypsy’ (All E.R.100 at 
103H, cited in Sandland 1996: 388), was con-
victed. The anti-gypsy provisions of the 1959 
Highways Act were subsequently transferred 
to the 1968 Caravan Sites Act, on the basis 
that the precedent of colloquial usage estab-
lished in Mills could escape challenge under 
the new race relations law of the same year. 
The topology of public space / permanent 
house / temporary site / illegal gypsy beside 
the road, left, to use Foucault’s phrase, ‘no 
spaces of primal liberty between the meshes 
of its network’ (Foucault 1980: 142). The 
state’s acknowledged legal obligation to 
‘facilitate the Gypsy way of life’9 meant, in 
practice, that g/Gypsies were confined to 
official sites, and that going on the road with 
a caravan or trailer effectively placed the g/
Gypsy outside the law.
To examine the specific logic of official 
Traveller dwelling that emerged in the years 
following the 1968 Caravan Sites Act, I turn 
next to the account of a raid on a local 
authority Traveller site (Figure 2).
2. The raid10
In 2005, police and council officials car-
ried out a raid on a local authority owned 
site that had been occupied for around fif-
teen years by an extended family of Irish 
Travellers. They inspected sheds, trailers, 
and chalets; demanded to see numer-
ous official documents, ranging from TV 
licences to motor insurance certificates; and 
ordered residents to pull down dog kennels 
in their yards. Finally, the officials stood in 
front of one of the dwellings that Travellers 
picturesquely call chalets, with perplexed 
expressions. 
Chalets are large, so-called static mobile 
homes, which are delivered to the site by 
low-loader and then rolled into position on 
Fig 2: Roadside camp. Ireland 2007.
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tiny wheels. Two can be joined together to 
make a five or six room dwelling that con-
forms to the 1968 definition of a mobile 
dwelling, though it scarcely resembles a 
caravan. Sometimes, chalets and caravans are 
dispersed around a yard and one is used as a 
kitchen and day-room, another as a parlour 
and bedrooms, and so forth. Once a chalet 
is in position, piers of concrete blocks are 
placed at each corner to level and stabilise 
it, and a skirting wall of blockwork is often 
constructed all round the base of the cara-
van to keep out drafts, damp, or animals. In 
keeping with the chalet, this skirting wall is 
frequently painted white. This was what had 
been done here.
Pointing at the ground beneath the wall 
an official asked, ‘Is there a concrete foot-
ing under there?’ The Travellers assured him 
there was not. Then, looking at the wall itself 
he demanded, ‘Is there any mortar between 
those blocks?’ The Travellers insisted there 
was no mortar, then to underline the point 
the men declared with bravado, ‘We can 
have the whole lot moved out in two hours!’ 
Everyone looked apprehensively at what 
resembled nothing less than a house, which 
had stood there for over ten years, with 
mains wiring, plumbing, and drainage. It 
was a tense moment, but the officials did not 
seek to have this verbal demonstration liter-
ally enacted.
While recounting this story, punctuated 
by the alarm, humiliation, and humour the 
raid evoked, the Travellers explained: ‘We are 
not allowed to do anything that goes below 
the surface of the ground.’ No matter how 
long the group occupies the site, in fact, 
even if they owned it, the site embodies a 
form of temporary dwelling whose material-
ity hinges on the gypsy defined in law as a 
nomad. Any sign of permanence would ren-
der the Traveller site meaningless, or chaotic. 
However, as in this case, the hypothetical 
mobility of Traveller dwelling is tested not by 
actual movement, but by demonstrations of 
its ability to be got rid of, which define its 
unlikeness to the real house. 
The site as a parallax
It is important to note that the site’s architec-
tural intentionality or status as a gypsy site is 
signified by the absence of something, more-
over, an absence that cannot be observed. 
The closer the inspectors get to the material 
site, the more the numinous substance of 
gypsy dwelling recedes from view. This real 
invisibility is affirmed by the Travellers qua 
gypsies, who know the rules of the game. 
They offer assurances that they can see the 
site in its all, both visible and invisible, and, 
by way of proof, they even offer to make 
it disappear completely. The constitutive 
gypsyness of the site, which is both more 
and less than its materiality, occupies a gap 
‘beyond the opposition of the phenomenal 
and the noumenal’ (Žižek 2006: 23), and in 
this gap (first person) Travellers appear as 
official (third person) gypsies. 
This can be understood as the phenomenon 
of the parallax, which Žižek uses to explore 
Kant’s category of the transcendental (Žižek 
2006: 20–28). The philosophical problem 
of the parallax is not simply that the same 
object perceived from two different positions 
leaves something unseen11 that would make it 
really whole—the Ding an sich or noumenal 
Thing-in-itself (Žižek 2006: 27)—but that see-
ing incorporates the incommensurability of 
perspective in the seen-object, something ‘in 
it more than itself’ (Žižek 2006: 18). Another 
way of describing the parallax, Žižek writes, 
is as a ‘minimal difference which divides one 
and the same object from itself,’ and is ‘itself 
an object’ (Žižek 2006: 18). In the raid, the 
incommensurable perspectives are those of 
officials looking for the spontaneity of tem-
porary dwelling in the official site’s mate-
riality, and of Travellers who know (as they 
say) what they are ‘not allowed’ to do. The 
‘irreducible asymmetry’ (Žižek 2006: 29), or 
parallax of the site corresponds to its official, 
transcendental status as an unhouse, which, 
like the gypsy defined as a nomad in all pos-
sible worlds, fulfils a ‘formal-structural func-
tion beyond the opposition of the noumenal 
and the phenomenal’ (Žižek 2006: 23). 
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The Travellers recognize the complexity of 
their official identification with the site. They 
willingly elicit the ‘appearance of a boundary’ 
that ‘generates resources of power’ (Mitchell 
1991: 90) between the real house and the 
site in the space of gesture, between per-
spective and performance, between-blocks 
and underground. The Traveller site under-
stood as a parallax is thus a gap in the sym-
bolic order of the house, an unhouse, ‘with 
no ontological consistency of its own’ (Žižek 
2006: 390). In gestures towards invisible 
mortar, absent footings, and spontaneous 
disappearance, the residents enact the fic-
tive conciliation between themselves and 
the council, the appearance of an agreement 
that the site remains only because it is per-
manently on the verge of expulsion. 
The more seemingly permanent the tem-
porary becomes, the more elaborate this 
sphere of gesture needs to be, as the site 
teeters between excess and absence of some-
thing that would make it what it must not be, 
either an agent endowed with its own point 
of view, or a mere simulation. To understand 
the something that is at stake, we must look 
more closely at the timing and context of this 
particular raid.
Sites as homes
In 2004, in the case of Connors v the United 
Kingdom (ECtHR 2004, App. No. 66746/01), 
the UK government argued in the European 
Court that the legal status of Traveller sites—
where Travellers had rights of tenure com-
parable neither to housed local authority 
tenants nor to residents of private residen-
tial caravan sites—was a way of protecting 
nomadism. The UK argued that such rights 
were against the interests of nomads.12 By 
this account, turning people out onto the 
side of the road (where their presence was, 
in any case, illegal,) was merely restoring 
nomads to their proper way of life. Finding 
against the state, the Strasbourg court per-
ceptively described the UK’s Traveller popu-
lation as ‘nomadic in spirit but not in actual 
or constant practice’ (ECtHR Judgment 2004, 
App. No. 66746/01: 29). The judgment 
pointed towards the increasing complexity 
and tenuous legality of what had become, in 
effect, the architectural condition of perma-
nent temporariness. 
The raid described above formed part of 
a wider post-Connors backlash. As soon as 
the officials left the site, the residents made 
phone calls and discovered that identical 
raids had been carried out on all council-
owned sites across the county. Evidently, the 
aim was to reduce the minimal security of 
long-term Traveller communities before legal 
reforms that must inevitably follow Connors 
brought Travellers closer to the status of 
council house tenants or protected site resi-
dents. Before they left the site, the officials’ 
final act was to issue each family (by yard) 
an Acceptable Behaviour Contract (ABC).13 
Everyone was told that unless they signed 
these so-called agreements they would be 
evicted. Far from being a tenancy agreement, 
an ABC paves the way for a local authority to 
seek an Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBO), 
or banning order, constituting a quick and 
easy method of barely legal eviction. 
What was it about the Connors judgment 
that inspired this reaction? The impact of 
Connors stemmed from the finding that 
sites were ‘homes’ under Article Eight of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
We should consider what is at stake in the 
undefined concept of ‘home’ (Fox 2005). 
Home, attached to but mystically distinct 
from the house, gathers the ‘structures of 
feeling’ (Williams 1977: 132) of a twenti-
eth century Euro-American habitus into 
the conviction that our homes are works 
of individuation, reflections of intimacy, 
and expressions of autonomy and desire. 
Home configures the ideology of a domain 
of subjectivity untouched by the histori-
cal structures of power of a public domain 
that exists somewhere else, but not here. 
Home, as noted above, resists an unresolved 
tension between property and the public 
status of private life, jointly objectified in 
the house. In other words, homes are the 
generative sites of subjects constituted by 
a particular political-economic form of the 
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house, which was now radically challenged 
by Connors. 
In finding that sites, yards, caravans and 
chalets were homes, the European Court, in 
the idiom of human rights law, introduced 
the ‘gypsy’ (sic) as a natural person, invoking 
the intentionality of dwelling and familism 
in which Traveller subjects are creative 
agents. Home, defined under Article Eight 
as ‘the place where someone lives,’ encom-
passes the body’s extension into objects, 
acts, and contingent relations of dwelling 
so that, exceeding their ordinary materiality, 
they become referents of personhood.14 Post-
nomadic subjects, described by the court 
as ‘nomadic in spirit, but not in … practice’ 
(ECtHR Judgment 2004, App. No. 66746/01: 
29), brought the fetishised category of the 
gypsy as nomad under attack. Gypsy dwelling 
in the curious modality of the permanently 
temporary site might now be seen as an 
equal position in the field legitimized by the 
house, and, in fact, as simply another form of 
the house. 
The implications of the Connors judg-
ment, together with the reforms of the 
2004 Housing Act, which ruled that local 
Travellers’ accommodation needs must be 
assessed together with those of settled resi-
dents, were perceived as a comprehensive 
attack on local government. The Traveller site 
was visibly merging into the house, and the 
raids formed part of a bid to re-inscribe its 
ideological separation.
Reforms15 introduced following Connors 
mean that local authority sites nominally 
share the same security of tenure as residents 
of private park homes, and that the caravan 
as home is also property. Planning Circular 
1/06 (ODPM 2006) introduced a modified 
definition of the nomad, ostensibly in order 
to reduce instances of old, sick, and vulner-
able people being turned out onto the road, 
because their bid to establish a legal, private 
site through planning permission could be 
rejected on the basis that, by this evidence 
alone, they were no longer legal gypsies. Its 
effect on evictions and planning approv-
als has been minimal. Notwithstanding 
these changes, planning law’s definition of 
nomadic gypsy dwelling, derived from Mills, 
meaning ‘with no, or no fixed, employment 
and with no fixed abode’ (All E.R.100 at 
103H, cited in Sandland 1996: 388), remains 
the essential underpinning of the perma-
nently temporary site. Whatever ‘goes below 
the ground’ or between the blocks material-
ises a diminishing distance from the perma-
nent house that the critical category of the 
gypsy—a nomad in all possible worlds—is 
held to justify. 
3. The field of the house
To conclude, I turn to the problem of subjectiv-
ity, and to Bourdieu’s account of the dialectic 
of habitus and field: the relation between the 
‘embodied dispositions’ and ‘belief’ of habi-
tus (1990: 68–70) and fields of power, prac-
tice, and sociality, whose earliest paradigm in 
Bourdieu’s work is that of dwelling and archi-
tecture in the Kabyle house (1977). The over-
arching question is whether post-nomadic 
subjectivity can be understood as the habitus 
of the permanently temporary site.
At first sight we have what, in Bourdieu’s 
terms, is a paramount example of a field: 
that of the post-war house. It is character-
ised by complicity between unequally posi-
tioned agents (landowners, householders, 
landlords, and tenants), the habitus of home 
where ‘history turned into nature is denied 
as such’ (Bourdieu 1977: 78), and dominated 
by technical and legal specialists whose ‘sym-
bolic power’ is veritably the ‘power to make 
things with words’ (Bourdieu 1989: 23), 
and whose ultimate object is control over 
the magic of commodity. The Traveller site 
demonstrates the arcane ‘magic of a world 
of objects’ (Bourdieu 1977: 91) that defines 
the production of this field. In one area, the 
symbolic magic of temporariness is policed 
through the quest for invisible mortar and 
footings. Elsewhere, another official, indif-
ferent to mortar, insists that a small gap be 
left between the blocks, so that, when lying 
flat on the ground, he can see the tiny wheels 
that enable the chalet to be rolled onto the 
ramps of a low-loader. Through the arcane 
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magic of such techniques, symbolic capital 
imposes its ‘vision of divisions’ (Bourdieu 
1989: 23) of the social world. 
But the difficulty remains that these tech-
niques and the objects that they create are 
neither exactly inside nor outside the field 
of capital determined by house-home-prop-
erty. Moreover, the power of its specialists 
is visibly diminishing in the face of external 
agency. They appear to police the insecure 
boundary of the permanent house while 
simultaneously creating a space within it for 
the permanently temporary site. The interde-
pendence and opposition between spheres 
of value described here as house-home-prop-
erty provide a clue as to why this is so. 
First, the autonomisation of fields that 
Bourdieu describes never finally or fully 
results in their autonomy, and fields, such 
as that of the house, collapse into indeter-
minacy and contradiction as they exceed, 
or fall short of, the historical necessities of 
the distribution of capital. These stumbling 
blocks suggest the persistent permeability 
and mutual resistance of fields: that their 
divisions of labour are incomplete. Following 
from this, the multiplicity of perspectives of 
subjects who inevitably inhabit not one, but 
multiple fields, repeatedly reconstitutes the 
parallax, or blind spot of minimal difference, 
in magical objects themselves. Contours of 
interdependence and resistance that incom-
pletely determine objects in relation to other 
objects (such as house and home) constitute 
the resources from which new objects, inter-
pretations, and subjectivities may arise. 
The post-war house, whose in-built 
standards of material substance, dimen-
sions, and permanence seemed so certain 
and well arranged, is suddenly discovered 
to contain, or to have invited in, the tem-
porariness it worked so hard to expel. The 
productive ambiguity of objects is thus the 
resisted source of the deformation of the 
sovereignty (Butler 2000) of the house in 
its encounter with the Traveller site, where 
post-nomadic unhouses constitute an 
imminent property market. I take the lesson 
of the parallax to imply that materiality is 
neither a form of closure that encompasses 
an object’s entrance into history, nor are 
human frames of meaning distinct from 
objects themselves. 
The politics of gesture
As the spectre of a land market for private 
sites begins to loom—driven since 1994 
by Traveller ownership of sites, both legal 
and illegal—Travellers who seek planning 
permission for a (new or existing) site are 
regularly challenged to prove their legal sta-
tus as gypsies in the form of an ‘aversion to 
bricks and mortar’ (cf. Johnson and Willers 
2007: 229–231). Gypsy status, a legal arte-
fact that protects the boundaries of the 
house, is now made visible, not through 
the increasingly indefinable ‘gypsy way 
of life,’16 but as the interiority of the sub-
ject as a natural person. Psychiatrists who 
testify in court to this aversion among g/
Gypsies thus seek to uphold the autonomy 
of subjects collectively determined by a 
pathology of architectural self-exclusion. 
Beyond the opposition of an imagined 
life on the road, ‘which remains the same 
in all possible (symbolic) universes’ (Žižek 
1997: 50), to which nomadic gypsies must 
still affirm their unwavering commitment, 
and an admission of its unattainability, the 
planning process—like the raid—elicits the 
parallax of the real g/Gypsy, whose desires 
and aversions, with remarkable consistency, 
confirm the rationality of law itself. 
The ‘new twist’ (Balibar 1994: 13) in this 
apparent interiorisation of g/Gypsy status 
is simply that the claim to private life in the 
site assumes the public self-relation of a very 
particular ‘transindividual’ voice, now openly 
declaring an ‘aversion’ to the house in pursuit 
of the permanently temporary. There is nei-
ther parody nor insincerity in this configura-
tion of post-nomadic subjectivity any more 
than there was in the Travellers’ offer during 
the raid to make the site disappear. But, in 
view of what we have argued concerning the 
inadequacies of Bourdieu’s idealised dialec-
tic between habitus and field, we can scarcely 
understand post-nomadic subjectivities as 
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the embodied dispositions of habitus. To 
understand how post-nomadic architecture’s 
public-private subjectivity is made visible, we 
might draw on Agamben’s concept of gesture 
as ‘the process of making means visible as 
such’ (Agamben 2000: 56–7). Gesture marks 
the intersection between what would negate 
or cancel each other out, such as spontane-
ity and performance, life and art, or public 
and private. It is the point at which conflict 
and accommodation meet and separate, still 
unresolved. Agamben writes:
The gesture is neither use value nor 
exchange value, neither biographic 
experience nor impersonal event: it is 
the other side of the commodity that 
lets the ‘crystals of this common social 
substance’ sink into the situation. 
(Agamben 2000: 80) 
The social and material relations of perma-
nent, temporary dwelling, affirmed in ges-
tures of desire and aversion by post-nomadic 
subjects, communicate the uncertain limits 
and possibilities of a social and material 
world whose sphere of mediality is architec-
ture, where ethical commitments and politi-
cal economy intersect.
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Notes
 1 Aufhebung or sublation in Hegelian dia-
lectic refers to the interagency of thesis 
and antithesis that subsumes their oppo-
sition.
 2 Article Eight, European Convention on 
Human Rights affords protection to ‘pri-
vate and family life … home and … corre-
spondence’.
 3 Irish Travellers and English Romanies are 
both regarded as ethnic Gypsies in UK law.
 4 For example, Planning Circular 1/06 
(ODPM 2006).
 5 Until 1965, building standards were 
established by local bylaws by councils or 
set out in non-statutory guidelines. The 
Public Health Act 1961 laid the ground 
for statutory national building standards 
that followed in the Building Regulations 
1965. 
 6 ‘Officialization is the process whereby the 
group (or those who dominate it) … binds 
itself by a public profession which sanc-
tions and imposes what it utters, tacitly 
defining the limits of the thinkable and 
the unthinkable’ (Bourdieu 1990: 108).
 7 Following the Criminal Justice and Pub-
lic Order Act (1994), which abolished 
the duty of local authorities to provide 
site for ‘gipsies,’ Planning Circular 1/94 
envisaged that Travellers would seek to 
acquire land of their own for sites and set 
out guidance and restrictions. (See Ken-
rick and Clark 1999: 141–144).
 8 Although the Act also extended to hawk-
ers and itinerant traders, Sandland notes, 
‘the offence did not turn on status but on 
actively hawking or trading’ (Sandland 
1996: 401, n. 49).
 9 See R (Margaret Price) v Carmarthen-
shire County Council. [2003] EWHC 42 
(Admin), Legal Action March 2003 pp. 
30–31.
 10 This account is drawn from my doctoral 
fieldwork carried out between 2006–
2008 in the UK and Ireland. 
 11 Žižek describes the phenomenon of par-
allax, drawn from astronomical observa-
tion, as ‘the apparent displacement of an 
object (the shift of its position against 
a background), caused by a change in 
observational position’ (2009: 17).
 12 This argument had been accepted by 
UK courts in the earlier cases of Somer-
set County Council v Isaacs (2002) EWHC 
1014 (Admin), and R (Albert Smith) v LB of 
Barking and Dagenham (2003) EWCA Civ. 
385; EWCH 2400 Admin. 
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 13 See: Home Office (2006): A Guide to 
Anti-Social Behaviour Orders and Accept-
able Behaviour Contracts. http://
webarchive .nat iona larch ives .gov.
uk/20100413151441/http:/crimereduc-
tion.homeoffice.gov.uk/asbos/asbos9.pdf
 14 Article Eight ‘concerns rights of central 
importance to the individual’s identity, 
self-determination, physical and moral 
integrity, maintenance of relationships 
with others and a settled and secure place 
in the community’ (ECtHR Judgment 
2004, Connors v. The United Kingdom 
App. No. 66746/01: 24).
 15 The Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 
extended the provisions of the Mobile 
Homes Act 1983 to local authority site 
residents. 
 16 ‘[T]here is a positive obligation imposed 
on the Contracting States by virtue of 
Article 8 to facilitate the gypsy way of life’ 
Chapman v United Kingdom (2001) 33 
EHRR 399 at para 96.
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